In Lebanon and Jordan the (non-)encampment of Syrian refugees is serving states' labour market goals. The Lebanese economy 'requires' large numbers of non-encamped low-wage Syrian workers, but the Jordanian regime assists its Transjordanian support base by restricting poor Syrians' access to the labour market through encampment. While acknowledging the importance of both states' differing historical experiences hosting refugees, and the security and budgetary motivations for policies of (non-)encampment, this article uses a critical political economy analysis of economic and labour market statistics to dislodge the centrality of the security discourses that increasingly inform discussions of refugee populations and the policies directed towards them. It demonstrates that the camp is not only a space of humanitarianism or a fertile ground for armed militancy, but a tool through which states spatially segregate those refugees, of certain socio-economic classes, whom they deem surplus to labour market requirements.
Introduction
In the four years following the beginning of the Syrian uprising, one of the key differences between Lebanon's and Jordan's responses to the Syrian refugee 1 crisis has been their encampment policies -their policies on the establishment of refugee camps, who will reside in them, and the restrictions placed on those living in them. Lebanon hosts around 1500 informal tented settlements (UNHCR, 2015a), many of which were formed independently by Syrians, but has consistently opposed the establishment of formal refugee camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) . No Syrian is made, by law, to live in an informal tented settlement, and the national government mostly allows Syrians to be employed in the informal labour market (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2014a). In Jordan, although around 80 per cent of Syrians live outside of camps, the government has established several refugee This is the accepted version of Turner, Lewis (2015) 'Explaining the (non-)encampment of Syrian refugees: security, class and the labour market in Lebanon and Jordan' Mediterranean Politics Vol. 20 (3) , 386-404. Published version available from: http://dx.doi. org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1078125 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23972/ 8 and runs refugee camps (Seeley, 2013) . Camps can be used to hold refugees temporarily, before their proposed eventual repatriation to their country of origin, thereby furthering the political aim of non-integration of refugees (Jaji, 2012) . These factors notwithstanding, the perception that refugees pose a security risk is often understood to be a key impetus for a policy of encampment. States can be concerned that refugees may attempt to intervene in the conflict from which they fled, trigger an intervention by the state from which they fled, or create destabilising competition for scarce resources (Loescher and Milner, 2005) , and may judge that refugees will be more easily monitored and controlled in camps (Jacobsen, 1996) . Because refugee movements disrupt the assumed trinity of state/nation/territory that is fundamental to the ideological underpinnings of the modern state system, refugees may even be 'presumed to be agents of insecurity' (Jaji, 2012: 227) . Conversely, camps themselves may be deemed a security threat, as they can provide shelter, resources and recruits for so-called 'refugee warriors' (Salehyan, 2007) , who have at times used the humanitarian label of camps to further their political and military agendas (Loescher and Milner, 2005) . States are typically more likely to believe that refugee camps pose a security threat when they judge that refugees are likely to attempt to intervene in an armed conflict, that the refugees' state of origin may intervene militarily against armed refugee movements, and that the state may lack the capacity to effectively control and monitor camps (Loescher and Milner, 2005; Terry, 2002) . Whether states or other political actors deem these possibilities to be likely is strongly influenced by the political and historical context of a host state, as will be demonstrated in the Lebanese and Jordanian cases.
Security and the Non-Encampment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
This is the accepted version of Turner, Lewis (2015) 'Explaining the (non-)encampment of Syrian refugees: security, class and the labour market in Lebanon and Jordan' Mediterranean Politics Vol. 20 (3), 386-404. Published version available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1078125 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23972/ 9 UNHCR has registered more than 1.1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, although the Lebanese government has always estimated the real figure to be significantly higher (UNHCR, 2013a) . For the first three years of the Syrian uprising, Lebanon 'broadly maintained an open-border policy' towards Syrians wishing to enter the country (Amnesty International (AI), 2013: 4), although, in line with its longstanding policy of attempting to reduce the size of the Palestinian population (see Peteet, 2005) , Lebanon placed restrictions on Palestinians wishing to enter from Syria (AI, 2013) . In 2014, however, Lebanon, a non-signatory of the 1951 convention, became increasingly restrictive in its entry policies towards Syrians. In April it shut eighteen unofficial border crossing points that it had previously tolerated (Nayel, 2014) , in October the cabinet decided that Lebanon would henceforth only accept refugees in 'exceptional' or 'urgent' humanitarian cases, and in January 2015 that all Syrians wishing to enter Lebanon must obtain a costly visa that severely limits their access to, and length of stay in, Lebanon (UNHCR, 2015b) . While Lebanon has allowed Syrians to set up informal tented settlements, or perhaps to an extent, given the weakness of the Lebanese state (Leenders, 2009) , was unable to prevent them from doing so, and allowed UNHCR to establish one transit site with 70 shelter units outside Arsal (UNHCR, 2014b), its adamant refusal to contemplate formal, UNHCR-run refugee camps is striking.
The combination of open borders (until October 2014) and non-encampment won Lebanon significant praise from human rights groups and UNHCR (Frelick, 2013 ).
Lebanon's policy articulated with UNHCR's changing attitude to encampment, with Ninette Kelley, the agency's representative to Lebanon, publicly praising the country as 'a model for dealing with refugees' (quoted in Dettmer, 2013) . Even in the face of rapidly rising numbers and a shortage of adequate shelter, when UNHCR recommended moving This is the accepted version of Turner, Lewis (2015) 'Explaining the (non-)encampment of Syrian refugees: security, class and the labour market in Lebanon and Jordan' Mediterranean Politics Vol. 20 International Crisis Group (ICG) 2013; Naufal, 2012; WB, 2013) . Although it has been argued that spatial segregation through encampment may reduce such conflicts (Jacobsen, 1996) , Lebanon has still refused to formally encamp Syrian refugees. (Khalili, 2005: 37) .
Informed by this history, Lebanese allies of the al-Asad regime, primarily Hizballah and the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), are among those most strongly opposed to encampment. The sectarian nature of Lebanon's political system and the sensitivity of the refugee question mean that their agreement would be needed to establish formal camps (UNHCR, 2013a). Hizballah, which sees its fate as closely tied to the Syrian regime, has openly expressed its concern that formal camps could provide safe havens for Syrian rebels, with its Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem arguing that 'any camp for Syrians in Lebanon will turn into a military pocket that will be used as a launch pad against Syria and then against Lebanon' (quoted in Daily Star, 2012) . The FPM, which has been openly hostile to Syrian refugees (ICG, 2013) , has claimed that some of those fleeing Syria are deliberately presenting themselves as poor, but are in reality armed militants who have come to Lebanon to 'create troubles' (Naufal, 2012: 17) .
While some argue that refugees in camps are easier to monitor and control (Jacobsen, 1996) , these parties may fear that the weak Lebanese state lacks the capacity to effectively police formal camps, as in the Palestinian case (see Hanafi and Long, 2010) , and may be unable to prevent the establishment of armed militias within them. Al-Asad's allies are concerned that camps would shape, strengthen and radicalize the identity of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, reinforcing existing anti-al-Asad sentiment (ICG, 2012) .
Furthermore, many Lebanese political parties are reluctant to repeat the policy of creating officially temporary camps for a large, mostly Sunni Muslim refugee population.
They fear that camps for Syrians could similarly become enduring features of the landscape and lead to a permanent Syrian population that would destabilize Lebanon's sectarian 'balance' (ICG, 2013; UNHCR 2013a) . The Lebanese case is therefore an example of key political actors viewing the establishment of refugee camps as a security threat, rather than a solution to a security threat, because of the history of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, Lebanon's weak state capacity, and the risk that camps could damage al-Asad's regime and cause instability within Lebanon. The perception that refugees are a security threat has led not to a policy of encampment and worse treatment of refugees, as is posited in much of the literature, but to a policy of non-encampment that has been widely heralded as a more humanitarian alternative to forced encampment. While it is crucial not to underestimate the tremendous challenges faced by refugees in Lebanon, unlike over 100,000 refugees in Jordan, they do not find themselves essentially confined by the government to refugee camps with very harsh conditions, very few labour market opportunities, and severe restrictions on freedom of movement (see UNHCR, 2013a). (Hall, 2013; UNHCR, 2013b) . Additionally, approximately 6,000 are hosted at Emirati Jordan Camp, which is funded and run by the United Arab Emirates.
Syrians wishing to leave a camp to enter Jordan can only do so legally through the 'bailout' system, in which a Jordanian citizen agrees to act 'as a guarantor of their whereabouts' (Seeley, 2013; c.f. AI, 2013) . Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been able to use this system successfully, although it has led to the exploitation of refugees, many of whom have, in their desperation to leave the camps, paid 'middlemen' around $500 to arrange to be 'bailed out' by Jordanian citizens unknown to them (UNHCR, 2013a). Not only is this amount well beyond the means of many refugees, but since early 2014 Jordan has consistently made bailout papers very hard to obtain (Achilli, 2015) .
Reflecting the widespread securitization of migration and Jordan's concerns about the on-going conflict in Syria, Jordan's policies towards Syrian refugees are attentive to those whom it deems a potential threat to its security. It holds Syrian military defectors separately to other Syrians, with over 2,000 living in a special military complex (Jordan Times, 2013) , denies entry to Syrian men who cannot prove that they have family in Jordan and to any Syrians lacking identity documents (AI, 2013) , and has arrested and expelled Syrians accused of being involved with terrorist organizations in Syria or of attempting to establish 'hostile organizations' in Jordan (Syrian Observer, 2014 ). Yet the establishment of refugee camps for Syrians in Jordan was not prompted by security concerns as much academic literature would predict, but nor did security concerns act as a strong motivator against the encampment of refugees. Jordan's policy, however, like Lebanon's, is influenced by its particular history of hosting refugees.
Jordan built camps for Palestinian refugees after the conflicts of 1948 and 1967, which were, during the height of the PLO's militarized presence in Jordan after the 1967 war, the competition between refugees and nationals for scarce resources, including employment, is one of seven factors potentially motivating the spatial segregation of refugees, is extremely rare within the literature. The academic and humanitarian literatures on Syrian refugees similarly fail to discuss a possible connection between encampment policies and labour market participation (e.g. AI 2013; Hall; ICG, 2013; Loveless, 2013; Naufal, 2012; UNHCR, 2013a) . Even where it is observed that in Lebanon labour market competition is increased by the absence of camps, nonencampment is attributed to concerns about security and a permanent refugee population (e.g. Christophersen, 2014) .
In Jordan, confining Syrian refugees from lower socio-economic classes to camps reduces the potential number of labour market participants who could compete with Jordanian workers and push down wages. While Iraqis in Jordan were overwhelmingly urban, well educated, and members of the upper and middle classes (Chatelard, 2010) , and Jordan benefitted significantly from their capital and economic investments (Saif and DeBartolo, 2007) , Syrian refugees are on average poorer, more rural in origin, and less educated than the Jordanian population (ILO and Fafo, 2015) . Syrians in Jordan are typically willing to work for lower wages and longer hours than their Jordanian counterparts ILO and Fafo, 2015) , and, unlike in Lebanon, before the refugee crisis, Syrians did not constitute a major part of the Jordanian labour force, although there are over 300,000 foreign workers in Jordan (Chatelard, 2010) . The Jordanian Labour Market Panel Survey of 2010, while likely to underestimate the migrant worker population because it surveyed only traditional households, not collective abodes, estimated that Syrians were less than one per cent of the working age population (Assaad, 2012) . This is the accepted version of Turner, Lewis (2015) 'Explaining the (non-)encampment of Syrian refugees: security, class and the labour market in Lebanon and Jordan' Mediterranean Politics Vol. 20 freedom of movement and freedom to work, and by creating the 'bailout' system. The 'bailout' system has an important class element, because, although it is becoming more restrictive (Achilli, 2015) , it has often enabled those Syrians with sufficient access to capital and connections to leave refugee camps into Jordanian host communities, but has simultaneously effectively consigned to camps the poorest Syrians, who might be expected to exert the strongest downward pressure on wages. 87 per cent of refugees in Zaatari, and 58 per cent of out-of-camp Syrians, are from rural backgrounds, and the residents of Zaatari are less likely to have completed secondary or university education than Syrian refugees living outside camps, who in turn are significantly less educated than the Jordanian population (ILO and Fafo, 2015) .
Encampment is one key aspect of Jordan's extensive attempts to prevent, or at least reduce, the employment of Syrians. While the government facilitates the provision of economic reforms and privatisations that 'accelerated rapidly' under King Abdullah (Ryan, 2010) who have for decades 'actively sought' a menial labour regime for Syrians (Chalcraft, 2009: 224) , are the clear economic beneficiaries of the policy of non-encampment.
At least until mid-2014, when Lebanon's attitude to the entry of Syrian refugees became increasingly restrictive, it consistently showed leniency towards those who did not obtain a work permit, and informal labour market participation has been very high, as has been detailed (ILO, 2014a). Nonetheless, as restrictions on their entry to Lebanon increased, there have been some police campaigns targeting Syrians refugees in employment (AlAkhbar, 2015) . However, it is noteworthy that, unlike Jordan, which since the beginning of the crisis has consistently attempted to prevent Syrians from working in the labour market, the sporadic targeting of Syrian workers in Lebanon has occurred concurrently to its increasingly restrictive border policies. Both may reflect the fact that while Lebanon camps, and demonstrates the importance of the labour market, refugees' socio-economic class, and economic policy-making to states' decisions about encampment and the treatment of refugees. While this argument has drawn on the specific cases of Lebanon and Jordan, it also illuminates the mechanisms through which states manage their labour markets and discipline their domestic labour forces in other contexts of large-scale forced migration. Where a host state believes its interests align sufficiently with an economic elite, is committed to a de-regulated labour market, and content to be reliant on large migrant worker populations, refugees of a low socio-economic class become an economic resource to be harnessed. Non-encampment and the facilitation of labour market participation are methods through which states create the necessary circumstances for the exploitation of the labour force (see LeBaron, 2015) . These policies lead to an increased labour supply, deflationary pressure on wages, and a nonnational labour force is thereby used to increase the economic precarity of nationals and non-nationals alike (see Standing, 2011) . Conversely, in other contexts, refugees can be understood to represent an economic threat in need of containment. Large-scale migration is regularly (perceived to) create labour market competition with nationals and to worsen the economic situation in a host country (Heizmann, 2015) . Where this (perception of) labour market competition leads to popular discontent and political pressure from sectors of the population that are considered in a position to threaten a regime's power, that regime may encamp refugees, thereby prioritizing its stability over the potential economic gains that could be accumulated through the exploitation of a precarious labour force. efficiency for humanitarian agencies (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond, 2005) . Camps can be a device for the monitoring and containment of refugees (Jacobsen, 1996) , a site of radicalization and armed militancy (Terry, 2002) , and a response to state security concerns (Loescher and Milner, 2005) . However, to view states' responses to refugee influxes solely through prevailing lenses of security or humanitarianism obscures the multiplicity of goals that states seek to achieve through their refugee camp policies. Just as scholars have argued that the categories of 'forced ' and 'voluntary', or 'political' and 'economic,' migration do not capture the complexity of migrants' experiences (Adamson, 2006; Chatelard, 2010; Chatty and Marfleet, 2013) , it must be recognized that refugees fleeing violence and persecution are simultaneously potential members of the labour force in their host states. The research presented here has demonstrated that the refugee camp, with its humanitarian veneer, is a particularly draconian tool through which states attempt to regulate the size and class composition of their domestic labour markets in response to refugee influxes. The recognition that states refuse to contemplate, or insist on building, refugee camps in order to integrate different classes of refugees into, or separate them from, the domestic economy, is crucial for developing a comprehensive understanding of for which groups of refugees camps are built, who is confined to them, and what conditions and restrictions they must suffer.
